ALBERTA

OFFICE OF THE INFORMATION AND PRIVACY COMMISSIONER

ORDER F2023-19

May 11, 2023

VILLAGE OF EDGERTON

Case File Number 018856

Office URL: www.oipc.ab.ca

Summary: The Applicant made an access request under the *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* (FOIP Act) to the Village of Edgerton (the Public Body) for a copy of his "complete complaint file". The Applicant specified that he was seeking his own personal information.

The Public Body responded, advising the Applicant that "there is a $25.00 administration fee for this, as well you are responsible for paying all costs associating (sic) with copying relevant documents, and you are responsible for paying costs associated with my time being spent redacting documents". The Applicant argued that his request was for his own personal information, and also requested that fees be waived. The Public Body did not change its position.

The Applicant requested a review of the Public Body's response, and subsequently an inquiry.

The Adjudicator found that the Applicant's request was for personal information, and ordered the Public Body to process the Applicant's request accordingly.

Statutes Cited: AB: *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. F-25, ss. 1, 72, 92, 93, Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulation, Alberta Regulation 1896/2008, Schedule 2

Authorities Cited: AB: Orders 97-003, F2010-036, F2012-16, F2013-10, F2013-53, F2013-54

Cases Cited: *Edmonton (City) v. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner)*, 2016 ABCA 110 (CanLII), *Edmonton (City) v. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner)*, 2015 ABQB 246

I. BACKGROUND

[para 1] The Applicant made an access request dated July 23, 2020, under the *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* (FOIP Act) to the Village of Edgerton (the Public Body) for the following:

> I [the Applicant] would like to Formally Request a Copy of my Complete Complaint File and ALL relevant Documents on File with the Village of Edgerton.
> As this request is for My PERSONAL INFORMATION it is a FREE OF CHARGE SERVICE.

[para 2] The Public Body responded, advising the Applicant that "there is a $25.00 administration fee for this, as well you are responsible for paying all costs associating (sic) with copying relevant documents, and you are responsible for paying costs associated with my time being spent redacting documents". The Applicant argued that his request was for his own personal information, and also requested that fees be waived. The Public Body did not change its position.

[para 3] The Applicant requested a review of the Public Body's response, and subsequently an inquiry.

II. RECORDS AT ISSUE

[para 4] As the issue relates to a fee waiver, there are no records at issue.

III. ISSUES

[para 5] The issues in this inquiry, as set out in the Notice of Inquiry, dated February 9, 2023, are:

1. Is the Applicant required to pay an initial $25 fee, per section 93 of the Act, for his access to information request? In other words, is the Applicant's request a request for his personal information?

2. If the Applicant is required to pay an initial $25 fee, should the Applicant be excused from paying the fee, as provided by section 93(4) of the Act?

IV. DISCUSSION OF ISSUES

Preliminary matters

[para 6] In his rebuttal submission, the Applicant raised a concern about the availability of certain information on the Public Body's website. The Applicant argues that the Public Body is not following the requirements of the *Municipal Government Act* regarding notifying the public

about bylaws, resolutions, meetings, etc. This is not a matter that falls under the scope of the FOIP Act; therefore, I will not consider this argument in the inquiry.

[para 7] The Applicant also raised a concern that the Public Body will destroy responsive records. Section 92(1)(g) of the FOIP Act makes it an offence to willfully destroy records in order to evade an access request. The records responsive to the Applicant's access request cannot be destroyed before responding to the request. In this case, there is no indication that the Public Body has destroyed any responsive records.

1. **Is the Applicant required to pay an initial $25 fee, per section 93 of the Act, for his access to information request? In other words, is the Applicant's request a request for his personal information?**

[para 8] Section 93 of the Act states in part:

> *93(1) The head of a public body may require an applicant to pay to the public body fees for services as provided for in the regulations.*
>
> *(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a request for the applicant's own personal information, except for the cost of producing the copy.*

[para 9] Section 1(n) defines personal information under the Act:

> *1 In this Act,*
>
> *(n) "personal information" means recorded information about an identifiable individual, including*
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> *(i) the individual's name, home or business address or home or business telephone number,*
>
> *(ii) the individual's race, national or ethnic origin, colour or religious or political beliefs or associations,*
>
> *(iii) the individual's age, sex, marital status or family status,*
>
> *(iv) an identifying number, symbol or other particular assigned to the individual,*
>
> *(v) the individual's fingerprints, other biometric information, blood type, genetic information or inheritable characteristics,*
>
> *(vi) information about the individual's health and health care history, including information about a physical or mental disability,*
>
> *(vii) information about the individual's educational, financial, employment or criminal history, including criminal records where a pardon has been given,*
>
> *(viii) anyone else's opinions about the individual, and*
>
> *(ix) the individual's personal views or opinions, except if they are about someone else;*

[para 10] In this case, the Applicant has requested a copy of his "complaint file". It is not clear what is encompassed by this request. However, the Applicant has indicated he believes that the

request is a request for personal information. This provides some indication of the records he believes would be responsive.

[para 11] With his request for review, the Applicant provided copies of correspondence with the Public Body relating to his access request. In that correspondence, the Applicant referred to his "personal complaint record". In his initial submission to the inquiry, the Applicant refers to his "request to access Any and All Personal Information the Village of Edgerton maintains on My Behalf up to including My Personal Complete BYLAW Complaint File which the Request presently under review (sic)".

[para 12] It appears that the Applicant intended to request a copy of 'his' bylaw complaints; though it is not clear whether those are complaints made against him/his property or complaints made by him.

[para 13] In its initial submission the Public Body states that the records it has identified as responsive include emails and complaints made against the Applicant, bylaw infraction letters, six harassment claims, investigation committees, and an Ombudsman investigation. With respect to the harassment claims and investigations, the Public Body has not specified how they are responsive to the Applicant's request. Presumably the Applicant initiated the harassment claims and investigations; I say this because there is no indication that the Applicant is employed by the Public Body so it seems unlikely that the Public Body would have records pertaining to such complaints made against the Applicant as an employee.

[para 14] With his request for review, the Applicant provided copies of correspondence between him and the Public Body. In an email dated August 19, 2020, the Public Body said

> I will reiterate, for the last time, that it is not your personal information but rather it is information about you. There is a definitive difference, and as such it is not free.

[para 15] In its initial submission, the Public Body argues:

> It is the [Village's] belief that the records pertaining to this enforcement request are not solely [the Applicant's] personal information, and therefore the municipality may charge the $25 fee.

[para 16] In Order 97-003, the former Commissioner set out the following approach to determine whether an access request is for personal information or a general request:

> In my view, if a request can be characterized as a request for access to personal information, a public body may not charge a service fee for any document that contains an applicant's personal information. However, a public body may charge service fees in relation to the documents that do not contain the applicant's personal information, even if the documents are characterized as a request for access to personal information.
>
> On the other hand, if documents are characterized as not being within the category of a request for personal information, the Public Body may charge services fees in relation to all those documents, even if they contain the applicant's personal information.
>
> To decide whether the Public Body may charge fees under [what is now section 93(2)] of the Act, there must be "a request for the applicant's own personal information". To

> decide whether there has been a request for the applicant's own personal information, I propose the following approach…:
>
> (i) Consider the wording of the request.
>
> (ii) Characterize the request as to the categories of records the applicant is requesting.
>
> (iii) Decide whether the records fall within those categories.
>
> If any part of the request can be characterized as a request for the applicant's own personal information, I then will decide whether each record (not page) found to be within that category "contains" the applicant's personal information, not whether each record in the category is "about" the applicant's personal information. As long as any part of the request falls within the category of a request for an applicant's own personal information, and a record within this category contains the applicant's personal information, a public body may not charge a service fee for that record.
>
> It follows that I do not agree with the Public Body's contention that [what is now section 93(2)] of the Act applies only if "...the application, fairly interpreted, pertains wholly or in all material respects to the applicant's personal information".

[para 17] I agree with this analysis. With respect to the Public Body's statement that the Applicant's request is not "solely" for his personal information, that is not the test to be applied. The Public Body must consider whether responsive records contain the Applicant's personal information. If any part of the request can be characterized as a request for personal information, and a record contains the Applicant's personal information, then section 93(2) applies with respect to fees that can be charged.

[para 18] In Order F2013-53 I considered whether an access request made to the City of Edmonton for copies of complaints made against the applicant, including records generated in relation to the complaints, was a request for the applicant's personal information. I found (at paras. 41-51):

> Many past orders of this office have considered whether information about property can also be personal information of an individual. In Order P2007-004, the Director of Adjudication considered whether information about an individual's home or property, such as inspections and repair work done to an individual's home, is personal information about that individual for the purposes of the access provisions PIPA. She surveyed decisions of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada and the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner and concluded:
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> > … The conclusion I draw from the cases is that information as to the nature or state of property owned or occupied by someone is their personal information if it reflects something of a personal nature about them such as their taste, personal style, personal intentions, or compliance with legal requirements.
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> In Order F2012-14, the adjudicator considered whether records relating to water well testing contain personal information about individuals, or if the information is only "about" property. The adjudicator also surveyed several decisions of the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner, as well as past Orders of this office. He concluded:
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> > What I glean from the foregoing relevant commentary is that a legal land description is not itself personal information: see *Leon's Furniture Ltd. v. Alberta*

> *(Information and Privacy Commissioner)* and Ontario Order MO-2053. However, a legal land description may serve as an identifier that will reveal what does constitute personal information: see the various Orders cited within Ontario Order MO-2053, which concludes that "the common thread in all these orders is that the information reveals something of a personal nature about an individual or individuals". The distinction between what is and is not personal information is demonstrated in Ontario Order PO-2900: the fact that an individual – who can be identifiable by virtue of information about property – drilled a well is his or her personal information, but information about the well itself is not his or her personal information.
>
> Consistent with the foregoing commentary are principles articulated by earlier Orders of the Office. When determining whether information is about an identifiable individual, one must look at the information in the context of the record as a whole, and consider whether the information, even without personal identifiers, is nonetheless about an identifiable individual on the basis that it can be combined with other information from other sources to render the individual identifiable [Order F2006-014 at para. 31, citing Ontario Order MO-2199 (2007) at para. 23]. Information will be about an identifiable individual where there is a serious possibility that an individual could be identified through the use of that information, alone or in combination with other available information [Order F2008-025 at footnote 1, citing *Gordon v. Canada (Minister of Health*), 2008 FC 258 (CanLII), 2008 FC 258 at para. 34].

The Public Body cites *Leon's* as support for its position that information about property is not personal information. However, I do not understand the Court in *Leon's* to be saying that information about property *can never* also be information about an individual such that it is also personal information. In my view, the comments of the Court do not lead to the conclusion that the broad definition of personal information specifically excludes information about property owned by an individual in any context. I note also that the Court of Appeal more recently observed that the definition of personal information in the *Personal Information Protection Act* (PIPA) is particularly broad and that "[i]t covers all personal information of any kind, and provides no functional definition of that term" (*United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401 v Alberta (Attorney General)*, 2012 ABCA 130, at para. 77).

This is consistent with Order P2012-01, in which the Director of Adjudication stated:

> It is not inconsistent with [*Leon's*] to say that in a case where the location of a property is associated with an individual in such a manner that it indicates where they reside, for example, where it is *given or designated as* a person's home address, the information does not merely "relate to an object or property", it relates to the individual, and it is information "about" that individual. The information is not about the person "just because" they may own the property, it is their personal information because it indicates where they live.

The Applicant's request for complaints about her property should be read in the context of the portion of the request that referred to complaints about her. The Applicant states in her submissions that she is concerned about what neighbours have said about her and the accuracy of statements made by the neighbours. She knows that some complaints have been made in relation to her property. Most of the Public Body's bylaw functions relate to property.

> It seems to me that the Applicant is seeking complaints made about her, even those that are expressed in terms of her property (because most of the complaints handled by the Public Body are regarding property and not individuals). In other words, the Applicant is primarily seeking information related to complaints made about her, whether they were made about her directly, or indirectly via complaints about her residence.
>
> In many cases the determination as to whether information is "personal information" is dependent on the context in which it appears. A statement that a property owner does not remove snow from the sidewalk adjacent his or her property seems to be a statement about the actions (or lack of action) of the property owner, rather than a statement about the property. Similarly, a statement about an owner's landscaping or gardening practices seems to be a statement about that owner's use of her property. In comparison, a statement about the lot grading of a property or a statement about the amount of snow on a sidewalk, appear to be statements about property (although it may relate to the property owner).
>
> Another distinction that has been made in past orders between information related to an individual and personal information about the individual is whether there is a "personal dimension" to the information. The adjudicator in Order F2010-011 commented that information about an individual's business may be personal information about that individual in circumstances that give a "personal dimension" to that information, such as allegations of wrongdoing. Similarly, information about employees acting in the course of their job duties is normally not considered information *about* those individuals; however, there may be circumstances that give that information a "personal dimension", such as disciplinary issues or performance evaluations (see Orders F2004-026 and P2012-09).
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> The Applicant is seeking complaints made about her or her property because she is concerned about what neighbours may be saying *about her*. Because the Applicant resides at the property at issue, complaints about the property could be characterized as complaints about her behavior. Following the above line of reasoning, these circumstances of the Applicant's request indicate that records containing complaints about her property have a "personal dimension" such that they contain information that is not merely related to the Applicant but is *about* her.
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> The records that are responsive to the Applicant's request (complaints about her and her property, and records resulting from those complaints) contain both statements about the Applicant's use of her property (her personal information) as well as statements about the property only (not the Applicant's personal information).
>
> I have concluded that the Applicant's request was aimed at complaints made about her, whether directly or via complaints about her property, and was a request for her personal information. The next step is to determine whether each record (not page) contains the Applicant's personal information. Records that do not contain the Applicant's personal information are not responsive to her request.

[para 19] This decision was upheld in *Edmonton (City) v. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner)*, 2015 ABQB 246, in which the Court found that information about property can be personal information, depending on the context. The Court went on to state (at paras. 62-65):

> [62] The further problem, though, is this: What context? A very brief response can be extracted from the Order - when "there are circumstances that give a personal dimension to an

individual's [property]-related activities:" para 36, quoting from Order F2010-011; see also para 48.

[63] ***Leon's Furniture*** provided some examples. In that case, Justice Slatter found that the adjudicator's conclusion that a driver's licence number is "personal information" was reasonable. The numbers – in their particular sequence - are abstract objects or abstract objects embodied in a physical card. They are "uniquely related to an individual:" at para 49. These numbers would fit as "personal information" under s. 1(n)(iv) of FOIPPA. The context has two elements. First, the context is a State-based system of assigning unique sequences of numbers to individuals for the purposes of licencing vehicle operators. The particular sequence of numbers on a person's driver's licence has its guarantee of unique linkage, its linkage to an identifiable individual, and its significance set by this context. Second, the information-holder has access to this context and the linkages it provides. Thus,

> The adjudicator's conclusion that the driver's licence number is "personal information" is reasonable, because it (like a social insurance number or a passport number) is uniquely related to an individual. With access to the proper database, the unique driver's licence number can be used to identify a particular person: *Gordon v. Canada (Minister of Health)*, 2008 FC 258 (CanLII), 324 F.T.R. 94, 79 Admin. L.R. (4th) 258 at paras. 32-4…: at para 49.

[64] In contrast, the sequence of numbers or letters or both found on a vehicle licence plate

> is a different thing. It is linked to a vehicle, not a person. The fact that the vehicle is owned by somebody does not make the licence plate number information about that individual. It is "about" the vehicle. The same reasoning would apply to vehicle information (serial or VIN) numbers of vehicles. Likewise a street address identifies a property, not a person, even though someone may well live in the property. The licence plate number may well be connected to a database that contains other personal information, but that is not determinative. **The appellant had no access to that database, and did not insist that the customer provide access to it**: para 49 [*emphasis added*].
>
> There is also a State-based system for assigning unique sequences of numbers and letters to vehicles, and that information is linked to owners. Critically, Leon's Furniture, the particular information-holder, did not have access to that system. (I note that Justice Slatter's observation respecting street addresses would not apply or would not apply without qualification under FOIPPA, since under s. 1(n)(i), "personal information" includes "the individual's name, home or business address or home or business telephone number;" see also Order P2012-01, quoted at para 44 of the Order.)

[65] The Adjudicator elaborated on the role of context in determining whether information about property can also be information about an individual. She quoted from Order P2007-004 (at para 41): "information as to the nature or state of property owned or occupied by someone is their personal information if it reflects something of a personal nature about them such as their taste, personal style, personal intentions, or compliance with legal requirements." She also quoted from Order F2012-14 (at para 42): "The distinction between what is and is not personal information is demonstrated in Ontario Order PO-2900 … the fact that an individual – who can be identifiable by virtue of information about property – drilled a well is his or her personal information, but information about the well itself is not his or her personal information."

[para 20] The Court further found (at paras. 77-79):

> [77] The Adjudicator's inclusive approach to "personal information" does not "open the floodgates" or entail a *reductio ad absurdum*. It does not transform all complaint information into personal information. Bylaw complaint information would only be personal information if the individual who was the subject of the complaint was the individual requesting the information; that is, third party requests for bylaw complaint information would not be requests for personal information (unless their personal information were intertwined with the complaint information). If the subject of the complaint were a corporation, the complaint information would not be personal information since corporate information does not fall within the definition of personal information: Order F2010-011 at para 15; Order F2002-006 at para 92. Even within the corpus of information collected in relation to a complaint, not all of the information is necessarily personal information. See, e.g., Order P2006-004 at para 12:
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> [PIPA] defines "personal information" as "information about an identifiable individual". In my view, "about" in the context of this phrase is a highly significant restrictive modifier. "About an applicant" is a much narrower idea than "related to an Applicant". Information that is generated or collected in consequence of a complaint or some other action on the part of or associated with an applicant – and that is therefore connected to them in some way – is not necessarily "about" that person. In this case, only a part of the information that the A/C asked for was information "about" him. Had he relied on PIPA to obtain information, he would not have received much of the information that was made available to him under the *Legal Profession Act* and the Rules created thereunder, or pursuant to the requirements of fairness.
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> [78] The inclusive approach favoured by the Adjudicator appears to be consistent with the approach in Ontario, recognizing that different results may follow in different statutory regimes. See Ontario IPC Order MO-2053 at pp 5-6:
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> Subsequent orders have further examined the distinction between information about residential properties and "personal information". Several orders have found that the name and address of an individual property owner together with either the appraised value or the purchase price paid for the property are personal information (Orders MO-1392 and PO-1786-I). Similarly, the names and addresses of individuals whose property taxes are in arrears were found to be personal information in Order M-800. The names and home addresses of individual property owners applying for building permits were also found to be personal information in Order M-138. In addition, Order M-176 and Investigation Report I94-079-M found that information about individuals alleged to have committed infractions against property standards by-laws was personal information. In my view, the common thread in all these orders is that the information reveals something of a personal nature about an individual or individuals.
>
> [79] The interpretation of "personal information" that includes bylaw complaints about an individual, such as the Applicant, is consistent with the broad approach to interpreting privacy legislation mandated by the Supreme Court and other authorities. Since the information directly bears on an individual's preservation of her interests in property as against the coercive powers of the City, the propriety of a broad approach to the interpretation of "personal information" is further supported.

[para 21] This Court of King's Bench decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal with respect to the discussion of personal information (but overturned on other grounds) in *Edmonton (City)*

v. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2016 ABCA 110 (CanLII). In that decision, the Court of Appeal stated (at paras. 25-28):

> [25] In general terms, there is some universality to the conclusion in ***Leon's Furniture*** that personal information has to be essentially "about a person", and not "about an object", even though most objects or properties have some relationship with persons. As the adjudicator recognized, this concept underlies the definitions in both the *FOIPP Act* and the *Personal Information Protection Act.* It was, however, reasonable for the adjudicator to observe that the line between the two is imprecise. Where the information related to property, but also had a "personal dimension", it might sometimes properly be characterized as "personal information". In this case, the essence of the request was for complaints and opinions expressed about Ms. McCloskey. The adjudicator's conclusion (at paras. 49-51) that this type of request was "personal", relating directly as it did to the conduct of the citizen, was one that was available on the facts and the law.
>
> [26] The City particularly disagrees with the finding of the adjudicator at para. 53: Many pages of the records provided to me by the Public Body, which it believed were not responsive to a request for personal information, contain only information about the Applicant's property (for example, the state of the sidewalk on a particular day"). However, these records appear to be records generated as a result of a complaint (and are therefore responsive to the applicant's request for her personal information). (emphasis added)
>
> The City argues that the adjudicator recognized that certain information related "only to property", yet required that it be produced. The adjudicator does not appear in this passage to resile from her conclusion that information about property has to have a "personal dimension" to be "personal information". Earlier on the adjudicator had held (a) the request for documents is to be categorized at face value, not based on what information the documents actually contain, and (b) if a document falls within the request, the whole document must be produced (para. 33). The challenged comment about "many pages" of the record, and being "responsive to the request" appear to relate to those issues, not the meaning of "personal information".
>
> [27] As previously stated, the boundary between personal information and information about property will not always be clear. The core of the personal information here was "complaints", and particularly complaints about how Ms. McCloskey dealt with her property. Exactly where to draw the line between (a) documents that are about the "complaint", and (b) those dealing with the processing of that complaint that are merely about the "property" is complex. The way the adjudicator drew the line in this case is not unreasonable. The drawing of the line did not involve the disclosure of sensitive, confidential, or privileged information; the only implication was that the City was not entitled to a $25 fee for producing some of these collateral documents. In the context of this case, the adjudicator's decision was reasonably available on the facts and the law.
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> [28] It follows that the adjudicator's decision on this issue was reasonable: the complaints against Ms. McCloskey, and the related opinions of her neighbours about her reasonably fell within the definition of "personal information", even though some of the conduct underlying the complaints related to her property.

[para 22] As was the case in Order F2013-53, the Applicant appears to be seeking information about him, contained in various complaint-related records in the custody or control of the Public Body. The Applicant appears primarily concerned about bylaw infraction records; however, the

Public Body's submission indicates that it considers other complaint-related records to also be responsive.

[para 23] In any event, the Public Body has not provided any reason for finding the analysis in Order F2013-53 does not also apply here; in my view, it does apply. The Public Body has not provided any support for the statement it made to the Applicant in its August 19, 2020 email, that there is a 'definitive difference' between the Applicant's personal information and information about the Applicant. As personal information is information about an identifiable individual, the distinction between personal information of the Applicant and information about the Applicant appears to be a distinction without a difference. If the records contain information about the Applicant, then the records contain his personal information. It is possible that some of the records only refer to the Applicant but do not contain information *about* him; however, this is not what the Public Body has indicated to the Applicant.

[para 24] I don't know how the Public Body has interpreted the Applicant's access request in order to come up with the records it identified as responsive in its submission. Given the apparent discrepancy between what the Applicant is referring to in his submission, and what the Public Body has referred to as responsive records in its submission, the Public Body may wish to clarify the scope of the Applicant's request or reevaluate the records it considers to be responsive to the Applicant's request for his personal information.

Conclusion

[para 25] From the information before me, it appears that the Applicant is making a request for his own personal information found in complaint-related records. Therefore, the Applicant is not required to pay the $25 initial fee, and the Public Body can charge fees only in accordance with section 93(2).

2. If the Applicant is required to pay an initial $25 fee, should the Applicant be excused from paying the fee, as provided by section 93(4) of the Act?

[para 26] I have found that the Applicant's request is a request for personal information, which is subject only to fees for producing a copy of the requested record (items 3-6 of Schedule 2 of the FOIP Regulation). Therefore, I do not need to consider whether the initial fee ought to be waived.

[para 27] That said, I will remind the Public Body of the parameters when estimating and charging fees for requests for personal information. As set out in the Regulation, the fees set out in items 3-6 of Schedule 2 may be charged only if the estimated fees exceed $10.

[para 28] In estimating fees, the Public Body can only charge for *actual* costs; the maximum amounts set out in Schedule 2 cannot be charged unless they represent the actual costs associated with providing the Applicant a copy of the records.

[para 29] In Order F2010-036, the adjudicator found that "[i]t is not open to a public body to charge the maximum amount for providing a service, if the public body's actual costs for providing the service are lower than the maximum" (at para. 145).

[para 30] If the Public Body is providing the Applicant with a copy of responsive records in hard copy, the Public Body must determine the actual costs associated with copying the records. For example, in Order F2013-10, the public body determined its actual costs to be $0.045 per page for photocopying, including paper, leasing costs and power (see para. 79). In Order F2012-16 the public body calculated a per-page cost of $0.0635, based on the cost of paper and related supplies, as well as the rental fee for the photocopier (see para. 22). In Order F2013-54 the public body calculated a per-page cost of $0.04685 for black and white copies, and $0.2169 for colour copies (see para. 56).

V. ORDER

[para 31] I make this Order under section 72 of the Act.

[para 32] I find that the Applicant's request was for personal information. I order the Public Body to process that request in accordance with the Act.

[para 33] I further order the Public Body to notify me in writing, within 50 days of being given a copy of this Order, that it has complied with it.

_____
Amanda Swanek
Adjudicator